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Abstract
Much work has been devoted, during the past twenty years, to using com-
plexity to protect elections from manipulation and control. Many results have
been obtained showing NP-hardness shields, and recently there has been much
focus on whether such worst-case hardness protections can be bypassed by fre-
quently correct heuristics or by approximations. This paper takes a very dif-
ferent approach: We argue that when electorates follow the canonical political
science model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the
first place. In particular, we show that for electorates having single-peaked
preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control
evaporate.
1 Introduction
Elections are a broadly used preference aggregation model in both human societies and mul-
tiagent systems. For example, elections have been proposed as a mechanism for collaborative
∗Supported in part by DFG grants RO-1202/{11-1, 12-1}, NSF grants CCF-0426761, IIS-0713061, and
CCF-0915792, Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education grant N-N206-378637, AGH University
of Science and Technology grant 11.11.120.777, the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES program
LogICCC, and Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Awards to Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaan-
dra. Work done in part during visits by the first three authors to Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf and
by the fourth author to the University of Rochester. Also appears as URCS-TR-2009-950. A preliminary ver-
sion of this paper appeared in the proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality
and Knowledge, July 2009 [FHHR09c].
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decision-making in such multiagent system contexts as recommender systems/collaborative
filtering [PHG00] and planning [ER91,ER97]. The importance of elections explains why
elections are studied intensely over a wide range of fields, including political science, math-
ematics, social choice, artificial intelligence, economics, and operations research. Formally,
an election system takes as input a set of candidates (or alternatives) and a set of votes
(usually each a 0-1 approval vector over the candidates or a linear order over the candidates)
and outputs a subset of the candidates as the winner(s).
Control refers to attempts to make a given candidate win [BTT92] (or not win [HHR07])
an election by such participation-change actions as adding or deleting voters or candidates.
Manipulation refers to attempts to make a given candidate win [BTT89,BO91] (or not
win [CSL07]) by some coalition of voters who strategically change their votes. There is
a large literature, started by the insightful contributions of Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and
Trick [BO91,BTT89,BTT92], on choosing election systems that make control and manip-
ulation NP-hard, i.e., on choosing election systems that seek to make control and manip-
ulation computationally prohibitive (see the survey [FHHR09b]). Recently, there has been
a flurry of work seeking to bypass worst-case manipulation hardness results by frequently
correct heuristics or approximation algorithms (as a few pointers into that literature, see,
e.g., [FKN08,XC08a,XC08b,CS06,PR07,BFH+08]).
The present paper takes a radically different approach. We study elections where the
vote set must be “single-peaked.” We’ll discuss single-peakedness in more detail after stating
our main contributions. But, briefly put, single-peakedness means that there is some linear
ordering of the candidates relative to which (in the model in which votes are linear orders)
each voter’s preferences always increase, always decrease, or first increase and then decrease,
or (in the model in which votes are approval vectors) each voter’s approved candidates are
contiguous within the linear order. Single-peaked preferences, introduced by Black [Bla48]
(see also [Bla58]), model societies that are heavily focused on one issue (taxes, war, etc.), and
the single-peaked framework is so central to political science that it has been described as
“the canonical setting for models of political institutions” [GPP], and indeed is typically the
model of societal voting first covered in an introductory course on positive (i.e., theoretical)
political science. This paper’s main contributions are the following:
1. We introduce the study of single-peakedness for approval-voting elections.
2. In Section 3 we show that for both voting by approval vectors and for voting by linear
orders, many election control problems known to be NP-hard in the general case have
polynomial-time algorithms in the single-peaked case.
3. In Section 4 we show that many election manipulation problems known to be NP-hard
in the general case have polynomial-time algorithms in the single-peaked case.
However—and in this we are inspired by the path-setting work of Walsh [Wal07], who
showed that Single Transferable Vote (for at least 3 candidates and weighted votes)
remains NP-hard to manipulate even in the single-peaked case—we in Section 4 also
show that many manipulation problems remain NP-hard even when restricted to the
single-peaked case.
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4. We show, contrary to intuition and the tacit assumptions of some papers, that even for
natural systems there are cases where increasing the number of candidates decreases
the complexity. In particular, we as Theorem 4.2 show that in the single-peaked
case in 3-veto elections (i.e., one votes against three candidates and for all others)
manipulation is in P for up to four candidates, is NP-hard for five candidates, and is
in P for six or more candidates.
We mostly defer discussion of related work until after our results, as the related work will
then have more context and definitions to draw on. However, we mention now a point raised
by a conference referee: Since “median voting” and “generalized median voter schemes” are
known to in many settings never give a voter an incentive to vote insincerely for single-
peaked electorates (see [Bar01] and [PS99], and the references therein, for definitions and
discussion), shouldn’t single-peaked electorates use only median voting? Our reply is that
in real-life scenarios voting rules are typically fixed (e.g., to be plurality or approval) and
cannot be changed when one suspects the electorate to be single-peaked. In addition, lack
of incentive to vote insincerely regarding manipulation does not say anything about a rule’s
resistance to control. Thus, we believe that our results are very interesting and relevant.
2 Preliminaries
Elections and Preferences. An election consists of a set C of candidates and a collection
V of votes. We will consider two different models for votes. One is that each vote is a
vector (an approval vector) from {0, 1}‖C‖, denoting approval (1) or disapproval (0) for
each candidate. The other is that each vote is a linear order (by which we mean a strict,
linear order—a complete, transitive, antisymmetric relation) over the candidates, e.g., Bob
> Alice > David > Carol. An election system is a mapping that takes as input a candidate
set C and a set V of votes over that candidate set, and outputs an element of 2C , i.e.,
outputs which candidates are winners of the election. (We, like Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92], do not expressly forbid elections with no winners, although all of the many
natural election systems discussed in this paper have the property that there is always at
least one winner when there is at least one candidate.) Except where we explicitly state
otherwise, V is a list of votes (ballots), so if three votes are the same, they will appear three
times in the list. We will use succinct input [FHH09] to describe the quite different input
model in which each preference that is held by one or more voters appears just once in the
list and is accompanied by a binary number stating how many voters have that preference.
The election systems of most interest to us in this paper are the following ones. In
approval voting, voters vote by approval vectors, and whichever candidate(s) get the most
approvals are the winner(s). A scoring protocol election, which is always defined for a
specific number m of candidates, is specified by a scoring vector, α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈
N
m, satisfying α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. Votes are linear orders. Each vote contributes
α1 points to that vote’s most preferred candidate, α2 points to that vote’s second most
preferred candidate, and so on. And whichever candidate(s) get the most total points are
the winner(s). Among the most important scoring protocols for m candidates are plurality,
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with α = (1,
m−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), j-veto (j ≤ m), with α = (
m−j︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), and Borda, with
α = (m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 0). For m candidates, j-approval and (m − j)-veto are the same
system. We’ll also speak of the veto system for an unbounded number of candidates, by
which we mean that on inputs with m candidates, each voter gives 1 point to all candidates
other than her least favorite candidate and 0 points to her least favorite candidate. We’ll
similarly also speak of plurality for an unbounded number of candidates, by which we mean
that on inputs with m candidates, each voter gives 0 points to all candidates other than her
favorite candidate and 1 point to her favorite candidate. And the general case of approval
voting is always for an unbounded number of candidates.
Let us fix some notation for the election systems defined above. Let (C, V ) be an election
and let c be a candidate in C. By score(C,V )(c) we mean the score of c in election (C, V ),
i.e., the number of points c receives under plurality, veto, or some given scoring protocol
and the number of c’s approvals under approval voting (it will always be clear from the
context, which election system the score refers to). If the candidate set C is clear from the
context, we simply write scoreV (c).
Single-Peaked Preferences. A collection V of votes, each vote vi being a linear order
>i over C, is said to be single-peaked exactly if there exists a linear order over C, call it L,
such that for each triple of candidates c, d, and e, it holds that:
(cL dL e ∨ eL dL c) =⇒ (∀i) [c >i d =⇒ d >i e].
That is just a formal way of saying that with respect to L, each voter’s degree of preference
rises to a peak and then falls (or just rises or just falls). The loose intuition behind this
is captured in Figure 1. If we imagine an electorate completely focused on one issue (say
taxes), with each person having a single-peaked (in the natural analogous sense of that
notion applied to curves) utility curve (but potentially different utility curves for different
voters), one gets precisely this notion (give or take the issue of ties). In Figure 1’s example,
the preferences of v1 would be c1 > c2 > c3 > c4 > c5, of v2 would be c3 > c4 > c2 > c1 > c5,
and of v3 would be c4 > c3 > c2 > c1 > c5.
The seminal study of single-peaked preferences was done by Black [Bla48], and that
work and many subsequent studies (e.g., [NW87,DHO70,PR97,Kre98,Bla58]) argued that
single-peaked preferences (in the unidimensional spatial model) are a broadly useful model
of electoral preferences that captures many important settings.1 Of course, issues that
are multidimensional—as many issues are—are typically not captured by single-peaked
preferences (by which we always mean the unidimensional case). And even in a society that
is completely focused on one issue, some maverick individuals may focus on other issues, so
one should keep in mind that the single-peaked case is a widely studied but extreme model.
1We mention in passing that since with single-peaked preferences there is always a Condorcet winner when
the number of voters is odd, every Condorcet-consistent voting rule has an efficient winner-determination
algorithm for odd numbers of voters [Wal07]. Of course, many interesting voting rules are not Condorcet-
consistent.
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Utility
candidate c1 candidate c2 candidate c5
Position on Taxes
low taxes high taxes
v1
v2
v3
candidate c3 candidate c4
Figure 1: Single-Peaked Preference Motivation: Utility Curves for Three Voters.
Looking again at Figure 1, let us imagine that each voter has a utility threshold at which
she starts approving of candidates. Then in the approval-vector-as-method-of-voting we’ll
have that for some linear order L, each voter either disapproves of everyone or approves
of precisely a set of candidates that are contiguous with respect to L. Formally, we say
a collection V , made up of approval vectors v1, v2, . . . , vn over the candidate set C, with
Approvesi being the set of candidates that vi approves, is single-peaked exactly if there is
a linear order over C, call it L, such that for each triple of candidates c, d, and e, it holds
that:
cL dL e =⇒ (∀i) [{c, e} ⊆ Approvesi =⇒ d ∈ Approvesi].
The reasons that single-peaked approval voting is compellingly natural to study (and the
reasons why one should not go overboard and claim that it is a universally appropriate
notion) are essentially the same as those, touched on above, involving single-peaked voting
with respect to preference orders. In many cases it is natural to assume that there is some
unidimensional issue steering society and that each person’s range of comfort on that issue
is some contiguous segment along that issue’s dimension. In such a case, each person’s set
of approved candidates will form a contiguous block among the candidates when they are
ordered by their positions on that issue. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper to study elections based on single-peaked approval vectors—although the literature
is so vast that we would not be at all surprised such elections had been previously studied.
In our control and manipulation problems, we’ll for the single-peaked case follow
Walsh [Wal07] and take as part of the input a particular linear order of the candidates rela-
tive to which the votes are single-peaked. This is arguably natural—as we may view candi-
dates’ positions on the issue that defines the entire election as being openly known. However,
one may wonder how hard it is to, given a set of voters, tell whether it is single-peaked. For
the case of votes being linear orders, Bartholdi and Trick ([BT86], see also [DF94,ELO¨08]; a
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somewhat related paper is [Tri89]) show by a path-based graph algorithm that the problem
is in P, and Doignon and Falmagne [DF94] and Escoffier, Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk [ELO¨08] show
how to produce in polynomial time a linear order witnessing the single-peakedness when
such an ordering exists. For the case of votes being approval vectors, the literature already
has long contained the analogue of both the results just mentioned. In particular, the work
of Fulkerson and Gross [FG65, Sections 5 and 6] and Booth and Lueker [BL76, Theorem 6]
proves (rephrased in our terminology) that in polynomial time—in a certain natural sense,
even in linear time—one can determine whether a set of approval vectors is single-peaked,
can in such a case efficiently find a linear ordering realizing the single-peakedness, and
indeed can implicitly represent all linear orderings realizing the single-peakedness.
Theorem 2.1 ([FG65,BL76]) Given a collection V of approval vectors over C, in polyno-
mial time we can produce a linear order L witnessing V ’s single-peakedness or can determine
that V is not single-peaked.
Note that Theorem 2.1 does not seem to follow from the analogous result for linear
orders. For example, extending each approval vector to form a linear order with all approved
candidates preceding all the disapproved ones, and then running the algorithm of Escoffier,
Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk [ELO¨08] on the thus transformed input does not work.
Control and Manipulation Problems. For an election system E , the Constructive
Control by Adding Candidates problem is the set of all (C, V, p, k, C ′), where V consists of
votes over C∪C ′, p ∈ C, and C∩C ′ = ∅, such that there is a set C ′′ ⊆ C ′ with ‖C ′′‖ ≤ k for
which candidate p is the unique winner under election system E when the voters in V vote
over C ∪C ′′ (i.e., we restrict each voter down to her induced preferences over C ∪C ′′). The
Destructive Control by Adding Candidates problem is the same except now the question is
whether there is such a C ′′ ensuring that p is not a unique winner.
The Constructive/Destructive Control by Deleting Candidates problems are analogous,
with inputs of the form (C, V, p, k), where k is a limit on how many candidates from C
can be deleted, and it is forbidden to delete p. The Constructive/Destructive Control by
Adding/Deleting Voters problems are analogous, with inputs respectively (C, V, p, k, V ′)
and (C, V, p, k), where V ′, V ′ ∩V = ∅, is a pool of “unregistered” voters, and k denotes the
bound on how many voters from V ′ we can add (Adding case) or how many voters from V
we can delete (Deleting case).
Constructive/Destructive Control by Unlimited Adding Candidates is the same as Con-
structive/Destructive Control by Adding Candidates except there is no “k”; one may add
any or all of the members of C ′.
Most of these problems were introduced in the seminal control paper of Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick [BTT92], and the remaining ones were introduced in [HHR07,FHHR09a]. These
problems model such real-world problems as introducing a candidate to run to split off
another candidate’s support; urging an independent candidate to withdraw for the good of
the country; spreading rumors that people with outstanding warrants who try to vote will
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be arrested; and sending vans to retirement homes to drive car-less members of one’s party
to the voting place.
In each case, the inputs we specified are for the “general” case. For the single-peaked
case there will be an additional input, a linear order L over the candidates such that relative
to L the election is single-peaked (with respect to all voters and candidates—even those in
C ′ and in V ′ in problems having those extra sets). (If L is not such a linear order, the input
is immediately rejected. L’s goodness can be easily tested in polynomial time, simply by
looking at each vote.) As mentioned previously, in assuming that L is given we are following
Walsh’s [Wal07] natural model—L is the broadly known positioning of the candidates.2
The (constructive coalition weighted) manipulation problem was introduced by Conitzer,
Sandholm, and Lang ([CSL07] and its conference precursors, building on the seminal ma-
nipulation papers [BO91,BTT89]) and takes as input a list of candidates C, a list of non-
manipulative voters each specified by preferences (as a linear order or as an approval vector,
depending on our election system) over C and a nonnegative integer weight, a list of the
weights of the voters in our manipulating coalition, and the candidate p that our coalition
seeks to make a winner. The set of all such inputs for which there is some assignment of pref-
erences to the manipulators that makes p a winner is the Constructive Coalition Weighted
Manipulation problem for that election system. The Constructive Size-k-Coalition Un-
weighted Manipulation problem is defined analogously, except with all voters having unit
weight and with k being the number of manipulators.
We follow the convention from [BTT89,BO91,BTT92] of focusing on the unique-winner
case for control and the winner case (i.e., asking whether the candidate can be made a
winner or be prevented from being a winner; following the literature, we’ll sometimes refer
to that as the “nonunique-winner model/case”) for manipulation. In many cases we’ve
shown a given result in both models and will sometimes mention that in passing. All of
the results of Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang of relevance to us hold in both models (see
Footnote 7 of [CSL07]).
For the single-peaked case, a linear order L is given as part of the input and the ma-
nipulating coalition’s votes must all be single-peaked with respect to L (as must all other
voters) for the input to be accepted.
Complexity Notions for Control and Manipulation Problems. If by a given type of
constructive control action we can never change p from not unique winning (not winning)
2Both for linear-order votes ([DF94], see also [BT86,ELO¨08]) and for approval-vector votes (Theorem 2.1)
it holds that even if L is not given one can find a good L in polynomial time if one exists. This fact may
be comforting to those who would prefer that L not be given. But we caution that a given vote set V
may have many valid L’s. And for some problems, which valid L one uses may affect the problem and its
complexity. Indeed, not having L as part of the input might even open the door to time-sequence issues, e.g.,
in deletion of candidates/voters, should we ask instead whether single-peakedness should only have to hold
after the deletion? (We’d say, ideally, “no.”) These issues are reasonable for further control/manipulation-
related study (and the issue of whether L is known a priori is much studied in the political economy
literature already, see, e.g., [AB04, Section 2.4]), but we find the Walsh [Wal07] model to be most natural
and compelling. In many cases our proofs work fine if L is not part of the input, and at times we’ll mention
that.
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to unique winning (winning) we say the problem is immune to that control type, and
otherwise we call it susceptible to that control type. The destructive case is analogous. If a
susceptible problem is in P we call it vulnerable, and if it is NP-hard we call it resistant. A
manipulation problem (such as the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem
defined above) is said to be vulnerable if it is in P and resistant if it is NP-hard. In each
control/manipulation case in this paper where we assert vulnerability (or membership in
P), not only is the decision problem in P but also in polynomial time we can produce a
successful control/manipulation action if one exists (i.e., the problem is what [HHR07] calls
certifiably vulnerable). Most of these notions are in detail from or in the general spirit of
the work of Bartholdi, Orlin, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92,BTT89,BO91], as in some cases
naturally modified or extended in [HHR09,HHR07].
Almost all NP-hardness proofs of this paper follow via reductions from the well-known
NP-complete problem PARTITION (see, e.g., [GJ79]). Specifically, we use the variant of
the problem where our input contains a set {k1, . . . , kn} of n distinct positive integers that
sum to 2K, and we ask: Does there exist a subset A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A ki = K?
3 Control
3.1 Results
We now turn to our results on control of elections. The theme of this paper is that electorates
limited to being single-peaked often are simpler to control and manipulate. Intuitively
speaking, we will show that the more limited range of vote collections allowed by single-
peaked voting (as opposed to general voting) is so restrictive that the reductions showing
NP-hardness fall apart—that those reductions centrally need complex collections of votes
to work. Of course, for all we know, perhaps P = NP, and so attempting to show that
no reduction at all can exist from SAT to our single-peaked control problems would be a
fool’s errand (or a Turing Award-scale quest). Rather, we’ll show our single-peaked control
problems easy the old-fashioned way: We’ll prove that they are in P. The techniques we
use to prove them in P vary from easy observations to smart greedy schemes to dynamic
programming.
The control complexity of approval voting is studied in detail by Hemaspaandra, Hema-
spaandra, and Rothe [HHR07] (see [ENR09] regarding limited adding of candidates, see also
the survey [BEH+] for an overview of computational properties of approval voting). Among
all the adding/deleting control cases defined in this paper (ten in total), precisely two are
resistant, and the other eight (all five destructive cases and the three constructive candi-
date cases) are immune or vulnerable. The two resistant cases are Constructive Control by
Adding Voters and Constructive Control by Deleting Voters.
The following theorem shows that both of these complexity shields evaporate for societies
with single-peaked preferences. Briefly put, the challenge here is that the set V ′ of voters to
add may be filled with “incomparable” voter pairs—pairs such that regarding their interval
with respect to the linear order defining single-peakedness, neither is a subset of the other—
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and so it is not immediately obvious what voters to add. We solve this by a “smart greedy”
approach, breaking votes first into broad groups based on where their intervals’ right edges
fall with respect to just a certain “dangerous” subset of the candidates, and then re-sort
those based on their left edges, and we argue that if any strategy will reach the control goal
then this one will.
Theorem 3.1 For the single-peaked case, approval voting is vulnerable to constructive con-
trol by adding voters and to constructive control by deleting voters, in both the unique-winner
model and the nonunique-winner model, for both the standard input model and the succinct
input model.3
Proof. We’ll cover the unique-winner cases only. From these it will be completely clear
how to handle the nonunique-winner cases. We’ll cover just the succinct-input cases, as
each implies the corresponding standard-input case. Susceptibility is immediately clear by
easy examples.
First, let’s speak of the societal linear order. In the model in which the (purported)
linear order is part of the input, start by doing the obvious polynomial-time check to see
whether this linear order truly is valid with respect to the voters V , the unregistered voters
V ′, and the candidates C. That is, check to ensure that each member of V and V ′ approves
either of no candidates or approves of a exactly a collection of candidates that are contiguous
with respect to the input linear order. If so, the votes of V ∪V ′, which are approval vectors
over C, are single-peaked with respect to the input societal linear order over C. If not,
output “Invalid societal linear order” and halt. (This very easy observation in effect shows
that, for the approval-vector case, checking a given purported societal linear order is in P.
That is equally obviously true for the votes-are-linear-orders setting, of course.)
If we’re in the model in which a linear order must be found, if one exists, relative
to which the problem is single-peaked and the given control action is possible, simply use
Theorem 2.1 to efficiently find some linear order relative to which our input is single-peaked.
If none exists, state that and terminate. If Theorem 2.1 gives us some valid order, it is not
hard to see that the algorithm we are going to give in this proof will find a successful control
action if and only if there exists any valid societal linear order relative to which a successful
control action exists. That is basically because if π1 and π2 are valid societal linear orders,
the votes are the same either way, and in each case the algorithm we are about to give
will succeed exactly if there exists a legal-cardinality collection of unregistered voters that
achieves the control goal.
So, let us take it that we have the societal linear order, which we’ll refer to as L. We
start with the case of adding voters. This proof will be done rather visually, and although
we’ll implicitly be sketching a general proof, we’ll keep close to heart an example, as that
will make the idea of the proof clearer. Let p be the preferred candidate—the one we seek to
3This result holds in our settled model in which the linear order specifying the society’s order on the
candidates is part of the input, and also holds in the model in which the linear order is not part of the input
but rather the question is whether there exists any valid linear order relative to which there is a way of
achieving our control goal.
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Figure 2: Bar chart of approvals from V , plus intervals indicating the votes in V ′ and their
multiplicities. The candidates are ordered in the societal linear order and the “dangerous”
candidates are marked with shaded bars.
make a unique winner. Figure 2 shows a representation of the initial state. In this figure, we
have (for display purposes) renamed all the candidates in a way that echos the societal linear
order L, i.e., the candidates are each labeled with respect to whether they are left or right
of p in L, and are ordered following the societal order. The bars represent the total number
of approvals each candidate gets over all the votes contained in V . (Since we’re in the
succinct-input case, we of course do in computing that take into account the multiplicities,
e.g., if candidate r10 is approved of in one ordering that occurs with multiplicity 4 and one
that occurs with multiplicity 3, and in no others, then the bar for r10 would show that it
gets 7 (not 2) approvals.) The intervals below the bar graph reflect the votes in V ′. Note
that each vote type in V ′ either approves of no candidates (in which case we won’t even
display it; it is of no help toward meeting our control goal) or, necessarily, is an interval
(although perhaps a degenerate one that contains exactly one candidate) with respect to L.
(Since we’re handling the succinct case, votes of the same vote type are in the figure listed
together along with their multiplicity to their right. We do this because in the input to
the problem votes come in by type and with a listed-in-binary multiplicity, in the succinct
case.)
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The number of vote types is O(‖C‖2), since each vote type (except for disapproving
of everyone) is defined by its left and right endpoints. And, even more to the point, the
number of vote types is trivially at most linear in the size of the input, since each vote type
cast by at least one voter has to appear in the input. So the number of vote types certainly
is not so large as to cause any challenges (about having enough time to consider the vote
types occurring in V ′) regarding remaining within polynomial time.
Now, at first, things might seem worrisome. How can we decide which votes to add,
especially between “incomparable” vote types such as (in our figure) the vote type with
multiplicity 2 and the vote type with multiplicity 7? Those two vote types each help p and
some other candidates, but the sets of other candidates helped are incomparable—neither
is a subset of the other.
We handle this worry by giving a “smart greedy” algorithm that only makes moves that
are clearly at least as safe as any other move, e.g., that will never close down the last path
to success if any path to success exists.
Let us look again at the figure. Note that although there are many candidates, we can
ignore all candidates except p herself and the candidates that are shaded—l6, l3, l2, r3, r6,
and r10. Why? Well, in our algorithm, we will never add any vote from V
′ that does not
approve of p. In fact, let us from now on consider V ′ to be redefined to have removed from
it every vote that does not approve of p. (So in the figure, the V ′ vote types shown with
multiplicity 5 and 9 go, as do any votes inside “etc.” that do not approve of p.) Now, since
we’ll never add a vote from V ′ that does not approve of p (indeed, we redefined V ′ to drop
such votes), and since each added vote will be an interval that includes p, notice that, for
example, if we add some votes from V ′ that cause p to have (in total, between the original
votes from V and added votes from V ′) strictly more approvals than r3, then p necessarily
will have strictly more approvals than r1 and r2, since each will have received from the
added votes from V ′ no more additional approvals than p received from those added votes.
By the same reasoning, if by adding votes from (our redefined) V ′ we ensure that p has
strictly more approvals than r6, clearly p will have strictly more approvals than r4 and r5.
4
And the same argument applies to the case of r10 and, in mirror image, the shaded left-side
bars. So, these are the only “dangerous” contenders that we have to worry about regarding
p. This observation will guide our choice of which votes to add and which candidates to
ignore.
Before going on, let us mention why we in the above went step-by-step. That is, one
might ask why we did not simply say that if p by adding votes from (our redefined) V ′ could
4The reader may worry that this “by the same reasoning” is not a valid claim, since one may worry that
since r5 starts above p in score, we may by adding votes that approve of both p and r5 (but not r6) end up
with p having strictly more approvals than r6 and yet with r5 having more approvals than p, contrary to
what our sentence above is asserting. The reason this reasonable worry is not actually a problem is that we
will (as will be made clearer later in the proof) use a particular step-by-step process. The process we follow
will, before even thinking of adding any votes approving r5, first have (if there is any path to ensuring this;
if not, control is impossible) ensured via adding votes that give approval to p but not to r3 (and thus not to
r5) that p has more approvals than r3. But note that after doing that, our “by the same reasoning” does
cleanly apply to the case of r4, r5, and r6. This point is not identical to, but rather works hand-in-hand
with, the point of the paragraph following the current paragraph.
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be made to defeat r10 then it necessarily would defeat all of r1 through r9. But that claim
in fact does not hold. Consider the case of adding 6 of the vote type having multiplicity 7 in
the figure. Doing so boosts p to 8 approvals, passing r10’s 7 approvals. But in the process, r3
rode the wave and was boosted to 9, and so p does not beat r3. That is, the argument of the
previous paragraph worked because the candidates we argued we could ignore were strictly
less approved, currently, than the “dangerous” voter we left in that outflanked them. Just
to be utterly specific, the first dangerous candidate to the right of p will be the leftmost
candidate to the right of p that from V gets at least as many approvals as p (if we were
in the nonunique-winner model, we would have said “strictly more approvals than p”). In
the figure, that is r3. And the next dangerous candidate is whichever candidate is the next
candidate to the right of that candidate that from V has strictly more approvals than that
candidate. In our figure, that is r6. And so on. And analogously on the left.
So, now that we’ve set out who the dangerous rivals are, let us see if there is a choice of
control action that can let us beat them. In this proof, we’ll show just how to beat the very
first of them, and then will mention how to continue the process to (attempt to) defeat the
rest of them. Crucially, the path we’ll take to defeat our first rival will be carefully chosen
so that it is the safest possible path—that is, if there is any overall successful control action,
then there will be one consistent with the actions we take to beat the first rival (and the
iterative repeating of the scheme we outline in this proof will in fact then find such actions).
So let us focus on the first dangerous rival. In our figure, that would be r3. (Note: If
there are no dangerous rivals, then p is already a unique winner, and we’re done. If the
only dangerous rivals we have are on the left, then mirror image the universe, i.e., reverse
L, and now all our dangerous rivals are on the right.) Now, to become the unique winner,
p must strictly beat r3. But note that among all the votes in V
′, the only ones that can
possibly make that happen are (keeping in mind that we consider V ′ to now have in it only
votes that approve of p) those votes in V ′ whose right endpoint falls in the half-open interval
[p, r3). Call this set B. These are the only votes in V
′ that let p gain approvals relative to
r3. So, in any control action at all that causes p to strictly beat (and we mention in passing
that if we were in the nonunique-winner model, we’d here say “tie or beat”) r3, we must
put enough votes from that collection, B, in to make that happen. So our only question is
which of these votes to add (if there even are enough of them to add to lead to success).
We do so as follows. We’ll add votes from among these starting first with the rightmost left
endpoint. This is a perfectly safe strategy, as that choice helps the same or strictly fewer
“left” dangerous candidates than would choosing a vote with a left endpoint that goes more
to the left. As to the worry that by within B looking only at the left endpoint we may favor
some right-side candidates that we might have otherwise slighted, that is so, but it is not a
worry. We indeed are treating all endpoints between p and just before r3 as a big blurred
class, but the differences among those endpoints affect just the (necessarily nondangerous)
candidates in-between, namely, in our figure, candidates r1 and r2, but we already argued
that by handling r3 we’ll handle both of those, so giving extra approvals to one or both of
those (that we could have avoided by making another choice within B) is not an issue. In
short we’ve intentionally smeared our right-end finickiness because it doesn’t matter, but
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left-end details matter a lot. So, in our figure, we need p to gain two approvals relative to r3.
Using the scheme/ordering just mentioned, we’ll among the votes in B keep eating through
votes until we either achieve this or until we’ve hit the control problem’s limit on the total
number of votes we are allowed to add from V ′. In this case, in our figure’s example, the
votes belonging to B (let us assume that the “etc.” members of V ′ contain no members of
B) are those votes contained inside the types [l4, p], [l3, r1], and [l1, r2]. The first vote type
to draw on among these is (not withstanding that doing so helps r2, unlike the case for the
other two members of B) [l1, r2], as it has the rightmost left endpoint. That vote type is
of multiplicity 1, so we take that one vote. The next vote type to draw on is [l3, r1]. Even
though that vote type is of multiplicity 2, p only needs one more approval to beat r3, so we
add to our election just one of the two of the votes of type [l3, r1].
And so we have defeated our first dangerous rival, and in the safest possible way—a way
that preserves a path to success if any exists.
The completion of the algorithm is basically to do this iteratively as long as candidates
remain that (relative to the current state of the votes) are dangerous. So, after we remove
a rival, we can consider all the added votes as if they are part of V now, and can redraw the
figure, and can move forward, and do all the above against the next dangerous candidate
on the right (of course, decreasing the limit on how many votes we are allowed to add
by the number we just added), or if we run out of candidates on the right, we can mirror
image L and start eating through any remaining dangerous candidates. (Regarding who the
dangerous candidates are, the recomputation just mentioned is natural. But we mention in
passing that the set of right-side dangerous candidates we’ll deal with in the algorithm is in
fact the same as the set initially identified—the picture updating won’t change it. However,
while handling those candidates, it is possible that some of the additional approvals given
to p will help it defeat some of the original left-side rivals, as a free side effect.) If we achieve
our control goal before burning through the k allowed additional votes from V ′ (recall that
k is part of the problem’s input) then we have achieved our control goal, and otherwise it
holds that our control goal cannot be achieved.
Let us now turn to the case of deleting voters. Since this case can be handled essentially
symmetrically to the adding-voters case (except that we now have a very different choice
of which voters to focus on and how to sort them in order to decide which to delete), we
merely highlight the differences between the two cases.
In the deleting-voters case, a picture showing our initial state would show just the bar
chart of Figure 2, i.e., the number of approvals from V each candidate gets initially. After
deletion, the deleted votes would show up below the bar chart, each again as an interval
corresponding to the candidates approved of by this voter. However, since it would be
pointless to delete a voter approving of p, all such intervals do not include p.
Now, we try to make p strictly beat the next dangerous rival to the right, starting with
r3 in the example shown in Figure 2 (ignoring, of course, the intervals indicating the votes
in V ′ and their multiplicities, as there is no V ′ in the deleting-voters case). To do so, we now
consider all the (remaining, i.e., not yet deleted in the current iteration of our algorithm)
votes with intervals whose left endpoint falls in the half-open interval (p, r3] (in the first
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iteration in our example). Now we sort these votes from the rightmost right endpoint to
the leftmost right endpoint. As in the adding-voters case (except there we added votes), we
now delete (following the sorted order) just enough votes so that p has one more approval
than r3. If that is impossible, we cannot control. But if it is possible, we’ve succeeded
in making p defeat r3 in the safest possible way. Recomputing the figure (where, in the
redrawn picture, updating the number of the candidates’ approvals implies that r3 no longer
is a dangerous candidate for p), we try to keep defeating p’s remaining dangerous rivals,
and when we run out of dangerous candidates to the right of p, we again mirror image
the universe by reversing L and try to make p defeat any remaining dangerous candidates.
Eventually, this process ends when we either succeed in making p the unique winner by
defeating all of p’s dangerous rivals, or we exceed the deletion limit k before reaching this
goal. All details not discussed here are obvious from the adding-voters proof. ❑
We turn from approval voting to plurality voting. Plurality voting’s constructive control
complexity was studied in detail in the seminal control paper of Bartholdi, Tovey, and
Trick [BTT92], and the destructive cases were added by [HHR07] (see [FHHR09a] for the
limited adding of candidates cases). For plurality, the situation is close to backwards from
approval. Regarding all the adding/deleting control cases defined in this paper, the four
voter cases are vulnerable but all six candidate cases are resistant. However, our results
here again are in keeping with our paper’s theme: All six of these cases become vulnerable
for single-peaked societies.
Theorem 3.2 For the single-peaked case, plurality voting is vulnerable to constructive and
destructive control by adding candidates, by adding unlimited candidates, and by deleting
candidates, and these results hold in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner
model.5
Our proofs of the different parts of this theorem vary greatly in approach. One approach
that is particularly useful is dynamic programming. We defer the proof of Theorem 3.2 to
Section 3.2.
For two very important voting systems—plurality and approval—we have seen that in
every single adding/deleting case where they are known to have NP-hardness complexity
shields, the complexity shield evaporates for societies with single-peaked preferences. In the
coming manipulation section we will also see a number of cases where NP-hardness shields
melt away for single-peaked societies, but we will also see some cases—and earlier such a
case was found by Walsh [Wal07]—where existing NP-hardness shields remain in place even
if one adds the restriction to a single-peaked society.
The previous paragraph raises the following natural question: Given that restricting
to single-peaked preferences can sometimes remove complexity shields, e.g., Theorem 3.1,
5This result holds in our settled model in which the linear order specifying the society’s order on the
candidates is part of the input, and also holds in the model in which the linear order is not part of the input
but rather the question is whether there exists any valid linear order relative to which there is a way of
achieving our control goal.
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and can sometimes leave them in place, e.g., Theorem 4.3, can restricting to single-peaked
preferences ever erect a complexity shield? It would be very tempting to hastily state that
such behavior is impossible. After all, the single-peaked case if anything thins out the flood
of possible control-actions/manipulations. But we’re talking about complexity here, and
fewer options doesn’t always mean a less complex problem. In particular, one of those
manipulation/control-action options that single-peakedness takes off the table might have
been a single, sure-fire path to victory under some election system. In fact, using precisely
that approach, and a few other tricks, we have built an artificial election system for which
unweighted constructive manipulation by size-3 coalitions is in P in the general case but
is NP-complete for the single-peaked case. The system’s votes are approval vectors. The
system is highly unnatural, highly unsatisfying, and would never be considered for real-
world use. However, its goal is just to show that (in a stomach-turningly contrived way)
restricting to single-peakedness in concept can, perhaps surprisingly, raise complexity. We
conjecture that that strange behavior will never be seen for any existing, natural election
system. We summarize this paragraph in the following (manipulation) theorem.
Theorem 3.3 There exists an election system E, whose votes are approval vectors, for
which constructive size-3-coalition unweighted manipulation is in P for the general case but
is NP-complete in the single-peaked model.6
Proof. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates that is lexicographically ordered (i.e.,
c1 is the smallest candidate in this ordering; note that this lexicographical ordering is not
related to the society’s ordering in single-peaked electorates) and let V be a collection of
approval vectors over C. Given C and V , election system E works as follows. If ‖C‖ ≤ 2,
all candidates win. Otherwise (i.e., if ‖C‖ ≥ 3) we have two possibilities:
1. If there exists no permutation making the given votes single-peaked (which, by
Theorem 2.1, can be tested in polynomial time) then all candidates win.7
2. Otherwise (i.e., if there is some permutation witnessing single-peakedness of the
votes),8 if the lexicographically smallest candidate, c1, when viewed as encoding a
6This result holds both in our settled model where L, the society’s ordering of the candidates, is part of
the input and in the model where L is not given and the question is whether there is any societal ordering
of the candidates that allows the manipulators to succeed.
7 This feature of the system allows a manipulating coalition to in the general (single-peakedness not
required) case cast votes precluding single-peakedness, an attack the single-peaked case does not allow.
8For the single-peaked case, our model also allows the election system E to directly access the input
permutation relative to which V is single-peaked. For “real” election systems this would be irrelevant
but regarding building an artificial counterexample system, such as E , this may be important, although
Theorem 3.3 holds in either case. Assuming that the election system knows the society’s permutation wit-
nessing single-peakedness, as our model does, matches the intuition that the societal ordering of candidates
is open information. Also, this assumption is fairer considering that our manipulation algorithms do get
direct access to the input permutation of society, and our model is that that permutation is fixed (in can-
didate/voter addition cases it already must handle all candidates and all voters, and in candidate/voter
deletion cases it must stick with the permutation even if after deletion other permutations are consistent
with the remaining candidates/voters). The permutation reflects “society” and does not change from what
the input says it is.
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boolean formula encodes a satisfying one and the lexicographically smallest approval
vector is all zeros, then all candidates win, else all candidates lose.
For the general case, the constructive size-3-coalition unweighted manipulation problem is
in P: Always have the three manipulators cast the following votes (with respect to the
lexicographic ordering of C = {c1, . . . , cm}):
(1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
(0, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
(1, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
ensuring that the electorate is not single-peaked, and so all candidates win, including the
distinguished candidate.
For the single-peaked case, however, the constructive size-3-coalition unweighted manip-
ulation problem is NP-complete. The problem is clearly in NP, and to show NP-hardness
we reduce the well-known NP-complete boolean formula satisfiability problem to it. Given a
boolean formula ϕ (encoded as a string in {0, 1}∗), map it to the instance (C, V, ϕ) of the con-
structive size-3-coalition unweighted manipulation problem, where C = {ϕ, 1|ϕ|+1, 1|ϕ|+2},
V consists of one nonmanipulator who approves of all candidates and three manipulators,
and where ϕ is the distinguished candidate the manipulators want to make win. We claim
that they can succeed in doing so exactly if ϕ is satisfiable. Indeed, if ϕ is satisfiable then
ϕ can be made a winner by one of the manipulators casting the vote (0, 0, 0). On the other
hand, if ϕ is not satisfiable (and the electorate is restricted to being single-peaked) then ϕ
cannot win, no matter which votes the manipulators cast. ❑
3.2 The Deferred Proof of Theorem 3.2
In this section we provide, as a series of lemmas that cover appropriate cases, our proof of
Theorem 3.2. One of the reasons why candidate-control problems for plurality are hard in
the general case (i.e., when the voters are not restricted to be single-peaked) is that then
adding or deleting even a single candidate can possibly affect the scores of all the other
candidates. However, in the single-peaked case adding or deleting a candidate can affect at
most two other candidates. This observation, formalized in the next lemma, is at the heart
of the vulnerability proofs of this section.
Lemma 3.4 Let (C, V ) be an election where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates, V is
a collection of voters whose preferences are single-peaked with respect to a linear order L,
and where c1 L c2 L · · · L cm. Within plurality, if m ≥ 2 then
1. score(C,V )(c1) = score({c1,c2},V )(c1),
2. for each i, 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, score(C,V )(ci) = score({ci−1,ci,ci+1},V )(ci), and
3. score(C,V )(cm) = score({cm−1,cm},V )(cm).
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Proof. Let (C, V ), L, and m be as in the statement of the lemma. We prove the second
case, 2 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 (the proofs of the boundary cases are analogous). Fix an integer i,
2 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Each voter v in C that ranks ci as her top choice, clearly, still prefers
ci to both ci−1 and ci+1 when limited to the choice between ci, ci−1, and ci+1. On the
other hand, consider a voter v in V who ranks some candidate cj , ci 6= cj, as her most
preferred candidate. If j ≤ i − 1 then, due to the fact that preferences are single-peaked
(or, j = i − 1), this voter prefers ci−1 to ci. If j ≥ i + 1 then, for the same reason, this
voter prefers ci+1 to ci. In either case, this voter does not give her point to ci. As a result,
score(C,V )(ci) = score({ci−1,ci,ci+1},V )(ci). ❑
Using Lemma 3.4, we show that in the single-peaked case plurality is vulnerable to
constructive control by adding candidates.
Lemma 3.5 For the single-peaked case, plurality voting is vulnerable to constructive control
by adding candidates both in the unique-winner model and in the nonunique-winner model.
Proof. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for the single-peaked variant of the con-
structive control by adding candidates problem. We focus on the unique-winner case, but
the proof can easily be adapted to the nonunique-winner model and we will be pinpointing
the necessary changes throughout the proof. Our input is an election (C ∪ A,V )—where
C = {p, c1, . . . , cm′} and A = {a1, . . . , am′′}—a candidate p in C, a nonnegative integer k,
and a linear order L over C ∪ A.9 After checking that the voters in V are single-peaked
with respect to L, we ask if it is possible to find a subset A′ of A such that (a) ‖A′‖ ≤ k
and (b) for each c ∈ C ∪ A′, c 6= p, it holds that score(C∪A′,V )(c) < score(C∪A′,V )(p)
(score(C∪A′,V )(c) ≤ score(C∪A′,V )(p), in the nonunique-winner case). Let D = C ∪ A and
let us rename the candidates so that D = {d1, . . . , dm}, where m = 1 + m
′ + m′′, and
d1 Ld2 L · · · Ldm. Without loss of generality we can assume that p is neither d1 nor dm.
If this were not the case, we could add to C two dummy candidates, d′ and d′′, that each
voter ranks as the least desirable ones and such that d′ Ld1 L · · · Ldm Ld
′′.
Before we describe the algorithm formally, let us explain it intuitively. Let us assume
that our instance is a “yes” instance and that A′ is a subset of A witnessing this fact. There
must be two candidates in C ∪ A′, dℓ and dr, that are direct neighbors of p with respect
to L restricted to C ∪ A′ (i.e., dℓ LpLdr and there is no di ∈ C ∪ A
′ such that di 6= p
and dℓ Ldi Ldr). By Lemma 3.4, the score of p is “fixed” by dℓ and dr in the sense that
score(C∪A′,V )(p) = score({dℓ,p,dr},V )(p). Also, given such dℓ and dr we can view C ∪ A
′ as
partitioned into the left part, Cℓ ∪A
′
ℓ, containing dℓ and the candidates preceding her, the
9If we are in the model in which no linear societal order is given simply use, for example, the algorithm of
Escoffier, Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk [ELO¨08] to find one relative to which our input is single-peaked. If none exists,
state that and terminate. If the algorithm of [ELO¨08] gives us some valid order, it is not hard to see that
the algorithm we are about to describe in this proof will find a successful control action exactly if there is
any valid societal linear order relative to which a successful control action exists. (In the remaining proofs
of Section 3.2, we’ll handle only the case that the societal order witnessing single-peakedness is given in
our polynomial-time algorithms showing vulnerability claims. Note, however, that this footnote’s argument
handles the case of such a societal order not being given analogously in each such case.)
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right part, Cr ∪A
′
r, containing dr and the candidates succeeding her, and the middle part,
containing p. The candidates in the left part and the candidates in the right part all have
scores lower than p.
The idea of the algorithm is to try all possible pairs of candidates dℓ and dr that can
be direct neighbors of p and to test, for each such pair, if it is possible to add candidates
so that (a) each of the candidates in the left part has a score lower than p, (b) each of the
candidates in the right part has a score lower than p, and (c) the number of candidates
added is at most k. This approach is formalized in the algorithm below.
1. For each pair of candidates, dℓ and dr, such that
(a) dℓ LpLdr, and
(b) there is no candidate ci ∈ C such that dℓ L ci Ldr,
execute Steps 2 through 5 below. After trying all pairs dℓ, dr without accepting, reject.
2. (a) Set b′ = score ({dℓ,p,dr},V )(p)− 1.
(b) Set Cℓ = {ci | ci Ldℓ} ∪ {dℓ} and Cr = {ci | dr L ci} ∪ {dr}.
10
(c) Set Aℓ = {ai | ai Ldℓ} and Ar = {ai | dr Lai}.
(d) Vℓ is the collection of those voters in V who, among the candidates in Cℓ ∪Cr ∪
Aℓ ∪ Ar ∪ {p}, rank first either dℓ or a candidate di such that di Ldℓ; Vr is the
collection of those voters in V who, among the candidates in Cℓ∪Cr∪Aℓ∪Ar∪{p},
rank first either dr or a candidate di such that dr Ldi.
11
3. Find a smallest (with respect to cardinality) set Bℓ, Bℓ ⊆ Aℓ, such that for each
c ∈ Cℓ ∪Bℓ it holds that score(Cℓ∪Bℓ,Vℓ)(c) ≤ b
′. If such a set Bℓ does not exist then
discard the current pair (dℓ, dr) and try the next one.
4. Find a smallest (with respect to cardinality) set Br, Br ⊆ Ar, such that for each
c ∈ Cr ∪ Br it holds that score(Cr∪Br ,Vr)(c) ≤ b
′. If such a set Br does not exist then
discard the current pair (dℓ, dr) and try the next one.
5. If ‖Bℓ‖+ ‖Br‖+ ‖A∩ {dℓ, dr}‖ ≤ k then accept (the set A
′ that we seek is Bℓ ∪Br ∪
({dℓ, dr} ∩A)).
It is easy to see that the above algorithm is correct and that it also works in the
nonunique-winner model if we replace Step 2a with b′ = score({dℓ,p,dr},V )(p). We will now
show that the algorithm runs in polynomial time. There are at most quadratically many
(with respect to m = ‖D‖) pairs (dℓ, dr) to try, so each of the above steps will be executed
10Yes, we put dℓ in Cℓ and dr in Cr even if either of them belongs to A.
11Note that if Bℓ is a subset of Aℓ and Br is a subset of Ar then in election (C ∪Bℓ ∪Br ∪ {dℓ, dr}, V ) it
holds that (a) each voter in Vℓ ranks first some candidate in Cℓ ∪Bℓ ∪ {dℓ}, (b) each voter in Vr ranks first
some candidate in Cr ∪ Br ∪ {dr}, and (c) all the remaining voters rank p first.
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at most polynomially often. It remains to show that Steps 3 and 4 can each be executed in
polynomial time. To this end, we define the following functional problem.
Definition 3.6 In the DemoteByAddingCandidates problem we are given an election
(C ∪ A,V ), where the voters in V are single-peaked with respect to a given order L, and a
nonnegative integer b. We ask what the size is of a smallest set A′ ⊆ A such that for each
candidate c ∈ C ∪A′ it holds that score(C∪A′,V )(c) ≤ b. If such a set A
′ does not exist then,
by convention, the answer is ∞.
Computing Bℓ (Br) in Step 3 (in Step 4) simply requires solving an instance of Demote-
ByAddingCandidates with election (Cℓ ∪Aℓ, Vℓ) (election (Cr ∪Ar, Vr)), order L (restricted
to an appropriate subset of candidates), and integer b = b′. Fortunately, DemoteByAdding-
Candidates is easy to solve.
Lemma 3.7 DemoteByAddingCandidates is computable in polynomial time.
Proof. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for the DemoteByAddingCandidates prob-
lem. Our input consists of an election (C ∪ A,V ), a nonnegative integer b, and a linear
order L over C ∪ A, where C = {c1, . . . , cm′}, A = {a1, . . . , am′′}, and voters in V have
single-peaked preferences with respect to the order L.12
Let D = C ∪ A and let us rename the candidates so that D = {d1, . . . , dm}, where
m = m′+m′′ and d1 Ld2 L · · · Ldm. Without loss of generality, we can assume that d1 ∈ C
and that m ≥ 3.13 Let i, j, and k be three positive integers such that 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ m.
We define
1. s(i, j, k) = score({di,dj ,dk},V )(dj),
2. s(0, j, k) = score({dj ,dk},V )(dj), and
3. s(i, j,m + 1) = score({di,dj},V )(dj).
Note that, by Lemma 3.4, if B is a subset of A such that (a) {di, dj , dk} ⊆ C ∪ B and
(b) there is no candidate dl (l 6= j) such that di Ldl Ldk, then s(i, j, k) = score(C∪B,V )(dj).
Let i and j be two positive integers such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m. By A(i, j) we mean
a family of subsets of A such that a set B, B ⊆ A, belongs to A(i, j) if and only if (a)
di ∈ C ∪B, (b) dj ∈ C ∪B, and (c) (C ∪B) ∩ {di+1, . . . , dj−1} = ∅.
We now define a key value for our algorithm. Let i and j be two positive integers such
that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m. We define
f(i, j) = min
B∈A(i,j)
{
‖B‖ | (∀dℓ ∈ C ∪B, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ i)[score (C∪B,V )(cℓ) ≤ b]
}
.
12Keep in mind that within the proof of this lemma, C, A, V , L, and b refer to the input to the Demote-
ByAddingCandidates problem, not to the input to the Control by Adding Candidates problem.
13If m were less than 3, we could add to C an appropriate number of dummy candidates, each ranked by
all the voters as less desirable than any of the candidates in C ∪ A. Extending L so that for each added
dummy candidate d it holds that dLd1 and the voters are single-peaked with respect to this extended L is
easy.
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We adopt the convention that min ∅ is ∞. It is easy to verify that the algorithm’s output
should be
min
1≤i<j≤m
{f(i, j) | {dj+1, . . . , dm} ⊆ A ∧ s(i, j,m + 1) ≤ b} .
It remains to show that we can compute the values f(i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, in polynomial
time. The rest of the proof is devoted to this task.
We compute the values f(i, j) using dynamic programming. Let j be a positive integer
1 < j ≤ m. It is easy to see that
f(1, j) =


∞ if there is some di ∈ C such that 1 < i < j,
∞ if the above does not hold but s(0, 1, j) > b,
‖A ∩ {d1, dj}‖ otherwise.
Given these initial values,14 we can compute arbitrary values f(j, k), 1 < j < k ≤ m, using
the following facts. Let us fix j and k such that 1 < j < k ≤ m. If there is a dℓ ∈ C such
that j < ℓ < k then f(j, k) =∞ (because A(j, k) is empty). Otherwise
f(j, k) = min
1≤i<j
{f(i, j) + χA(dk) | s(i, j, k) ≤ b},
where χA is the characteristic function of A (i.e., χA(dk) is 1 if dk ∈ A, and is 0 otherwise). It
is easy to see that using standard dynamic-programming techniques and the above equations
we can compute f(i, j) for arbitrary positive integers i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, in polynomial
time. ❑ Lemma 3.7
This completes the proof that for the case of single-peaked voters, plurality is vulnerable
to constructive control by adding candidates. ❑ Lemma 3.5
As a corollary to Lemma 3.5, we obtain the corresponding result for the case of adding
an unlimited number of candidates, because for each unlimited case it is sufficient to use
the algorithm for the corresponding limited case with the limit on the number of candidates
that can be added set to equal the number of spoiler candidates.
Corollary 3.8 For the single-peaked case, plurality voting is vulnerable to constructive con-
trol by adding an unlimited number of candidates in both the unique-winner model and the
nonunique-winner model.
In the following proofs (both in the destructive adding-candidates cases and in the
deleting-candidates cases) in addition to Lemma 3.4 we will need one more tool, namely,
the notion of a neighborhood of a candidate c in an order L witnessing single-peakedness
of an electorate.
Definition 3.9 Let (C, V ) be an election and let L be an order such that the vot-
ers in V are single-peaked with respect to L. Let c be a candidate in C. We
14Note that here it is important that d1 ∈ C. If this were not the case, we would also have to directly
compute the values f(i, j) for some i, j where 1 < i < j.
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rename the candidates in C such that C = {bm′ , . . . , b2, b1, c, d1, d2, . . . , dm′′} and
bm′ L · · · L b2 L b1 L cLd1 Ld2 L · · · Ldm′′ . For each two positive integers i and j we set
Dij(C, c) = {b1, . . . , bmin(i,m′)} ∪ {d1, . . . , dmin(j,m′′)}. We define the direct neighborhood of
a candidate c to be the set D(C, c) = {Dij(C, c) | 0 ≤ i ≤ m
′ and 0 ≤ j ≤ m′′}.15
Clearly, given a single-peaked election (C, V ) and a candidate c ∈ C, ‖D(C, c)‖ is
polynomial in ‖C‖. We now turn to the destructive adding-candidates cases in both the
unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. The proof is much simpler than in
the constructive cases.
Lemma 3.10 For the single-peaked case, plurality voting is vulnerable to destructive control
by adding candidates in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model.
Proof. Let (C ∪ A,V ) be an election where C = {d, c1, . . . , cm}, A = {a1, . . . , am′}, and
V is a collection of voters whose preference orders are single-peaked with respect to a given
order L. The candidates from C are already registered and the candidates from A can be
added (i.e., A is the spoiler candidate set). Let k be some nonnegative integer. We now
give a polynomial-time algorithm that tests whether there exists a set A′ ⊆ A such that
(a) ‖A′‖ ≤ k and (b) d is not a unique winner of (C ∪A′, V ).
The algorithm works as follows: For each up-to-3-element subset A′′ of A, check if d is a
unique winner of (C ∪A′′, V ) and accept if this is not the case (for the first such A′′ found).
If we have not accepted for any such subset A′′ then reject. This algorithm clearly works
in polynomial time. It remains to show that it is correct. If for each A′ ⊆ A it holds that
d is a unique winner of (C ∪ A′, V ) then the above algorithm (correctly) rejects. On the
other hand, let us assume that for some A′ ⊆ A it holds that d is not a unique winner of
(C ∪A′, V ) and let us fix one such A′. We claim that there is an up-to-size-3 subset A′′ of
A such that d is not a unique winner of (C ∪A′′, V ).
Let B = D1,1(C ∪ A
′, d), that is, B contains the direct neighbors of d (among the
candidates in C ∪ A′, with respect to L). By definition, ‖B‖ ≤ 2, and, from Lemma 3.4,
score(C∪A′,V )(d) = score(B∪{d},V )(d). Since d is not a unique winner of (C ∪ A
′, V ), there
is some candidate c ∈ C ∪ A′, c 6= d, such that score (C∪A′,V )(c) ≥ score(C∪A′,V )(d). Define
A′′ = (B ∪ {c}) ∩ A. Clearly, ‖A′′‖ ≤ 3 and, since B is a “radius-1” neighborhood of d, we
have score(C∪A′′,V )(d) = score(B∪{d},V )(d). On the other hand, since C ∪A
′′ ⊆ C ∪ A′ and
c belongs to both sets, it holds that score(C∪A′′,V )(c) ≥ score(C∪A′,V )(c). It follows that in
election (C ∪A′′, V ) candidate c has a score at least as high as that of d and, thus, d is not
a unique winner of (C ∪A′′, V ).
It is easy to see that the same approach can be used to solve the nonunique-winner case.
Our algorithm now tries all up-to-3-element subsets A′′ of A and accepts if and only if there
is one such that d is not a winner of (C ∪A′′, V ). The proof of correctness is analogous to
the unique-winner case. This completes the proof. ❑
15The notation of this definition, in essence, ties the order L to the candidate set C. We will sometimes
wish to speak of, e.g., Dij(C
′, c) for some C′ ⊆ C, c ∈ C′, and this notation allows us to naturally, implicitly
speak of an order L′ induced by C′.
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As an easy corollary we obtain that in the single-peaked case plurality is also vulnerable
to destructive control by adding unlimited candidates.
Corollary 3.11 For the single-peaked case, plurality voting is vulnerable to destructive con-
trol by adding an unlimited number of candidates in both the unique-winner model and the
nonunique-winner model.
We now turn to the constructive and destructive deleting-candidates cases in both the
unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. The main idea of our algorithms for
the deleting-candidates cases is that it is sufficient to focus on deleting candidates adjacent
to the preferred one (to increase her score) and then to delete those remaining candidates
that still defeat the preferred one.
Lemma 3.12 For the single-peaked case, plurality voting is vulnerable to constructive
and destructive control by deleting candidates in both the unique-winner model and the
nonunique-winner model.
Proof. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for the single-peaked case of constructive
control by deleting candidates for plurality. We focus on the unique-winner model but it is
easy to see how to modify our algorithm to work in the nonunique-winner model.
Our algorithm’s input contains an election (C, V ), a preferred candidate p ∈ C, a
nonnegative integer k (the number of candidates that we are allowed to delete), and an
order L such that the voters in V are single-peaked with respect to L.
By Lemma 3.4, we see that the only possible scores that p can have after deleting some
candidates are in the set S = {score(C−D,V )(p) | D ∈ D(C, p)} and that each of these scores
can be obtained by deleting some subset D ∈ D(C, p) of the candidates. In consequence,
to ensure that p is the unique winner we first need to delete some subset D ∈ D(C, p) of
candidates and then—since it is impossible to decrease a candidate’s score via deleting other
candidates—delete all those candidates that still have more points than p. Of course, we
do not know a priori which set D in D(C, p) to delete, but since ‖D(C, p)‖ is polynomially
bounded in ‖C‖, we can try all its members.
Formally, our algorithm works as follows.
1. For each D ∈ D(C, p), execute Step 2. If, after trying all D’s, we do not accept, reject.
2. (a) While there exists a candidate c ∈ C − D, c 6= p, such that score(C−D,V )(c) ≥
score(C−D,V )(p), add c to D.
(b) If ‖D‖ ≤ k then accept.
Clearly, this algorithm works in polynomial time and, by the preceding discussion, it accepts
if and only if it is possible to ensure p’s victory via control by deleting candidates. For the
nonunique-winner case, we simply need to change the inequality in Step 2a from “≥” to
“>.”
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In the destructive case we are given an election (C, V ), a despised candidate d ∈ C, a
nonnegative integer k (the number of candidates we can delete), and an order L such that
the voters in V are single-peaked with respect to L. (We assume that d is a unique plurality
winner of (C, V ); otherwise, we can immediately accept.) It is sufficient to find a candidate
c and a subset D ⊆ C − {d} of candidates such that ‖D‖ ≤ k and score(C−D,V )(c) ≥
score(C−D,V )(d). As in the constructive case, by Lemma 3.4, it suffices to try each candidate
c ∈ C−{d} and each set D ∈ D(C, c). That is, if there is a candidate c ∈ C−{d} and a set
D ∈ D(C, c) such that (a) ‖D‖ ≤ k, (b) d /∈ D, and (c) score(C−D,V )(c) ≥ score (C−D,V )(d),
then we accept. Otherwise we reject. Clearly, this algorithm works in polynomial time
and, by Lemma 3.4 and the fact that deleting candidates does not decrease the remaining
candidates’ scores, is correct. The algorithm can be modified in an obvious way to work for
the nonunique-winner model. ❑
4 Manipulation
In this section we study constructive coalition weighted manipulation. Recall that in the
single-peaked case the manipulators must cast votes that are consistent with the linear
ordering of the candidates (which is part of the input in the single-peaked case) that defines
the society’s single-peakedness. However, all our “single-peaked case is in P” results in this
section also hold in a model in which the linear order of the candidates is not part of the
input and we will comment on these cases in our proofs below.
This paper’s theme is that single-peakedness removes many NP-hardness shields, and
for manipulation we show that via Theorem 4.1 (and its implications within Theorem 4.2)
and Theorem 4.4. Note that in the general case, the election systems of parts 1 and 3 of
Theorem 4.1 and the “k1 ≥ 2 ∧ k0 ≥ 1” cases of part 2 of this theorem are known to be
NP-complete [HH07,PR07,CSL07], and the remaining part 2 cases are easily seen to be in
P [HH07].)
Theorem 4.1 For the single-peaked case, the constructive coalition weighted manipulation
problem (in both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-winner model) for each of the
following election systems is in P:
1. The scoring protocol α = (2, 1, 0), i.e., 3-candidate Borda elections. (This is a special
case of Theorem 4.4.)
2. Each scoring protocol α = (
k1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
k0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), k1 ≥ k0. (This includes a variety
of ℓ-veto and ℓ′-approval protocols, e.g., the 3-veto cases for m ≥ 6 candidates in
Theorem 4.2.)
3. Veto.16
16All three of Theorem 4.1’s cases hold both in our settled model where L, the society’s ordering of the
candidates, is part of the input and in the model where L is not given and the question is whether there is
any societal ordering of the candidates that allows the manipulators to succeed.
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Proof. For each of the election systems stated in the theorem, we give a polynomial-time
algorithm solving the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem for the single-
peaked case. Each of these algorithms takes as input a list C of candidates, a list S of
nonmanipulative voters each specified by a single-peaked preference over C (with respect to
the given linear ordering L on C that defines single-peakedness) and an integer weight, a list
of the weights of the voters in our manipulating coalition T , and the candidate p ∈ C that
the manipulators in T seek to make a winner (a unique winner). Note that all manipulators
in T must also have single-peaked preferences with respect to L.
The scoring protocol α = (2, 1, 0). We start with the nonunique-winner case. Let
C = {a, b, p}. Without loss of generality, it is enough to consider the following two societal
orderings L. (If L is not part of the input, we simply try all societal orders.)
Case 1: aL pL b. Due to single-peakedness, only the following votes are allowed with
respect to L:
p > a > b, p > b > a, a > p > b, b > p > a.
Note that, regardless of the weights of the voters in S, we have scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(a)
or scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(b). So, at most one of a and b beats p, say a. Set all votes in
T to p > b > a.
Case 2: pLaL b. In this case, due to single-peakedness, only the following votes are al-
lowed with respect to L:
p > a > b, a > p > b, a > b > p, b > a > p.
In this case, a best vote for all voters in T is p > a > b.
In both cases, we accept if the manipulation action described above was successful (i.e.,
made p a winner in election (C,S ∪ T )), and we reject otherwise.
To handle the unique-winner case, note that Case 2 remains the same. For Case 1, even
if scoreS(b) = scoreS(p), setting all voters in T to p > b > a will work and is still optimal.
In both cases, for checking success of the manipulation action we now test whether it makes
p the unique winner.
Scoring protocols α = (
k1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
k0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), k1 ≥ k0. Let α = (
k1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
k0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0),
k1 ≥ k0, be a scoring protocol. We will handle the cases k1 > k0 and k1 = k0 separately.
As above, we will present algorithms for both the nonunique-winner model and the unique-
winner model.
First, assume k1 > k0. In any election with m = k0 + k1 candidates, if the voters are
single-peaked with respect to some linear order L,17 then the middle candidate(s) (namely,
the ⌈m/2⌉nd candidate in L if m is odd, and the (m/2)nd and the (1+m/2)nd candidate in L
17If L is not part of the input, we simply try all possible societal orderings. This can be done in polynomial
time, since there are only a constant number of candidates.
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if m is even) will always be among the winners. Thus, given an instance of the constructive
coalition weighted manipulation problem, our distinguished candidate p can be made a
winner in (C,S ∪ T ) if and only if p does not lose a point in S. So our algorithm checks
whether p does not lose a point in S and accepts or rejects accordingly.
For the unique-winner case within scoring protocol α = (
k1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
k0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), k1 > k0, p
can be made a unique winner if and only if
1. p does not lose a point in S, and
2. for all candidates c that are tied with p in S, it is possible to make c lose a point in
T (while keeping T single-peaked with respect to L).
Since the number of candidates is fixed, our algorithm can easily check whether these two
conditions hold and then accepts or rejects accordingly.
Now, assume k1 = k0. Given an instance of the constructive coalition weighted manipu-
lation problem, it is enough to consider a linear order L (which witnesses single-peakedness;
also, recall Footnote 17) that ranks at least k = k0 = k1 candidates before p and fewer than
k candidates after p: c1 L c2 L · · · L cℓ LpL cℓ+2 L · · · L c2k with ℓ ≥ k. For every candi-
date ci, ℓ + 2 ≤ i ≤ 2k, to the right of p, we have scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(ci), and for every
candidate cj , k + 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, to the left of p and to the right of the middle, it holds that
if p gets a point then so does cj . It follows that p can be made a winner if and only if p
is a winner in (C,S ∪ T ) when every voter in T ranks the candidates from right to left by
c2k > c2k−1 > · · · > cℓ+2 > p > cℓ > · · · > c1.
For the unique-winner case within scoring protocol α = (
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0), if p’s right
neighbor in L is tied with p in S (i.e., scoreS(cℓ+2) = scoreS(p)), then set a voter of lowest
weight in T to p > cℓ > cℓ−1 > · · · > c1 > cℓ+2 > · · · > c2k and set all other voters in T
to rank the candidates from right to left by c2k > c2k−1 > · · · > cℓ+2 > p > cℓ > · · · > c1.
(Note that T is single-peaked with respect to L.) Our algorithm can easily check whether
this makes p a unique winner in (C,S ∪ T ), and if so it accepts, otherwise it rejects.
Veto elections. The proof for veto elections (i.e., for scoring protocols α = (1, . . . , 1, 0)
where the number of candidates varies), similarly as the proof of the previous part of
this theorem, hinges on the following observation: Given an instance of the constructive
coalition weighted manipulation problem, where the votes are single-peaked with respect to
the society’s order L, p can be made a winner if and only if p is the only candidate or p is
never last in S.
For the unique-winner case, note that since at most two candidates can be ranked last
in single-peaked elections, unique winners within veto elections can only exist if ‖C‖ ≤ 3.
The result for ‖C‖ ∈ {2, 3} follows from the previous part of the theorem, and the ‖C‖ = 1
case is trivial. This completes the proof of the last part of Theorem 4.1 and the whole
proof. ❑
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We now come to an unusual case. For general votes (not limited to single-peaked
societies), the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem for 3-veto is in P for
three or four candidates, and is NP-complete (and so resistant) for five or more candidates
(see [HH07]). (3-veto is not meaningfully defined for two or fewer candidates.) However, for
single-peaked votes, 3-veto shows a remarkable behavior: Moving from five to six candidates
lowers the complexity of this manipulation problem. In some papers, authors state that
if one knows the number of candidates (if any) at which a system switches from easy to
manipulate to hard to manipulate, it is easy by adding dummy candidates to see that for
all larger number of candidates the system remains hard. The following theorem should
stand as a caution to take that view only if one has carefully built and checked a “dummy
candidates” construction for one’s specific case.
Theorem 4.2 For the single-peaked case, the constructive coalition weighted manipulation
problem (in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model) for m-candidate
3-veto elections is in P for m ∈ {3, 4, 6, 7, 8, . . .} and is resistant (indeed, NP-complete) for
m = 5.18
Proof. Consider the following four cases.
m = 3. In this case, we are looking at the scoring protocol (0, 0, 0). It is immediate that
in this scoring protocol all candidates are always tied for winner, and so p can always
be made a winner. For the same reason, p can never be a unique winner.
m = 4. In this case, we are looking at the scoring protocol (1, 0, 0, 0). It is immediate
that p can be made a winner (a unique winner) if and only if p is a winner (a unique
winner) in the election where every manipulator ranks p first.
m = 5. In this case, we are looking at the scoring protocol (1, 1, 0, 0, 0). It is immediate
that the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem is in NP (simply guess
single-peaked votes for the manipulators and verify that p is a winner of the election).
To show NP-hardness, we reduce from PARTITION.
Given an instance of PARTITION, i.e., a set {k1, . . . , kn} of n distinct positive integers
that sum to 2K, construct the following instance of Constructive Coalition Weighted
Manipulation: The set of candidates is C = {a, b, c, d, p} with p being our distinguished
candidate. The set of nonmanipulators S consists of two voters, each of weightK. One
of the voters votes c > a > p > b > d and the other voter votes d > b > p > a > c.
(Note that these two voters fix the society’s order.) We also have a set T of n
manipulators. The weights of the manipulators are k1, k2, . . . , kn. We claim that
there is a partition if and only if the manipulators can cast single-peaked votes that
make p a winner.
18This result holds both in our settled model where L, the society’s ordering of the candidates, is part of
the input and in the model where L is not given and the question is whether there is any societal ordering
of the candidates that allows the manipulators to succeed.
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First suppose that there exists a subset S′ of {k1, . . . , kn} that sums to K. For every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we set the weight ki manipulator to p > a > b > c > d if ki in S
′ and
to p > b > a > c > d otherwise. In the resulting election, a, b, and p each score 2K
points and c and d score K points. It follows that p is a winner of the election.
For the converse, suppose the voters in T vote single-peaked such that p is a winner
of the election. Since for every single-peaked vote, if p gets a point then a or b gets
a point, it follows that scoreT (p) ≤ scoreT (a) + scoreT (b). Since p is a winner of
the resulting election, scoreT (p) ≥ K + scoreT (a) and scoreT (p) ≥ K + scoreT (b).
It follows that scoreT (p) = 2K and that scoreT (a) = scoreT (b) = K. But then the
weights of the voters in T that give a point to a sum to K and so we have found a
partition.
Changing the weights of the voters in S from K to K − 1 handles the unique-winner
case.
m ≥ 6. This has already been proven as the special case k1 ≥ k0 = 3 of part 2 of
Theorem 4.1.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2. ❑
We now present some cases that are known (see [HH07]) to be NP-hard in the general
case and that we can prove remain hard even in the single-peaked case.
Theorem 4.3 For the single-peaked case, the constructive coalition weighted manipulation
problem (in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model) is resistant
(indeed, NP-complete) for the following scoring protocols:
1. α = (3, 1, 0).
2. α = (3, 2, 1, 0), i.e., 4-candidate Borda elections.19
Proof. We consider the two scoring protocols, α = (3, 1, 0) and α = (3, 2, 1, 0) separately.
In each case it is easy to see that the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem
is in NP and it remains to give the NP-hardness proof.
The scoring protocol α = (3, 1, 0). To show NP-hardness, we reduce from PARTI-
TION. Given a set {k1, . . . , kn} of n distinct positive integers that sum to 2K, define the
following instance of the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem: The can-
didate set is C = {a, b, p}, there are two nonmanipulative voters in S, one of the form
a > p > b and one of the form b > p > a (note that S is single-peaked with respect to
aL pL b, its reverse, and no other order) and both of weight 5K, and there are n manipu-
lators in T where the ith manipulator has weight ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
19Both cases of Theorem 4.3 hold both in our settled model where L, the society’s ordering of the candi-
dates, is part of the input and in the model where L is not given and the question is whether there is any
societal ordering of the candidates that allows the manipulators to succeed.
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We claim that there exists a partition (i.e., a set A ⊆ I = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that∑
i∈A ki =
∑
i∈I−A ki) if and only if the manipulators can cast single-peaked votes (with
respect to L) that make p a winner of (C,S ∪ T ).
From left to right, suppose there is a partition A ⊆ I = {1, 2, . . . , n} with
∑
i∈A ki =∑
i∈I−A ki. Set those voters in T whose weights are ki, i ∈ A, to p > a > b, and set
the remaining voters in T (i.e., those with weights ki, i ∈ I − A) to p > b > a. Note
that T is single-peaked with respect to L. We have scoreS∪T (p) = 10K + 6K = 16K and
scoreS∪T (a) = scoreS∪T (b) = 15K +K = 16K, so p is a winner of (C,S ∪ T ).
From right to left, suppose T is set such that it is single-peaked with respect to L and p
is a winner of (C,S ∪ T ). Without loss of generality, we may assume that p is first in every
voter in T . Thus scoreS∪T (p) = 16K. So, for p to be a winner, we must have scoreT (a) ≤ K
and scoreT (b) ≤ K. But then T corresponds to a partition.
Changing the weights of the voters in S from 5K to 5K − 1 handles the unique-winner
case for α = (3, 1, 0).
The scoring protocol α = (3, 2, 1, 0). We again give a reduction from PARTITION
to show NP-hardness. We start with the nonunique-winner case.
Given an input to the PARTITION problem, i.e., a set {k1, . . . , kn} of n distinct positive
integers that sum to 2K, we form the following instance of Constructive Coalition Weighted
Manipulation. The candidate set is C = {a, b, c, p} with p being our distinguished candidate,
the single-peakedness order L is given by aL bL pL c,20 and the set S of nonmanipulative
voters contains two voters, v1 and v2. Voter v1 has weight 11K and preference order
c > p > b > a and voter v2 has weight 7K and preference order b > a > p > c. There are n
manipulators in the manipulator set T and the ith manipulator, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has weight ki.
We claim that the manipulators can cast votes that ensure that p is a winner in (C,S ∪ T )
if and only if {k1, . . . , kn} can be partitioned into two subsets that sum to K.
Not counting the manipulators’ votes, the candidates have the following scores:
1. scoreS(a) = 14K,
2. scoreS(b) = 32K,
3. scoreS(p) = 29K, and
4. scoreS(c) = 33K.
Since the total weight of the manipulators is 2K and we use scoring vector (3, 2, 1, 0), it
is easy to see that irrespective of what votes the manipulators cast, candidate a can never
become a winner. Using this fact, it is easy to see that out of the eight preference orders
o1, o2, . . . , o8 (see Table 1) that are consistent with L the manipulators can limit themselves
to choosing between o5 = p > b > a > c and o7 = p > c > b > a. (For each of the remaining
orders Table 1 explains why either o5 or o7 is at least as good an order to cast.)
20If L is not part of the input, we add two voters to S, namely a > b > p > c and c > p > b > a, each of
weight 1, who fix the society’s order to be our required L (or, equivalently, L’s reverse).
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Order Comments
o1 a > b > p > c The manipulators are better off casting o5 instead (p gets more points,
a gets fewer points, and the scores of b and c do not change).
o2 b > a > p > c The manipulators are better off casting o1 instead (and, in effect, are
better off casting o5) because a cannot become a winner anyway and
casting o1 decreases b’s score.
o3 b > p > a > c The manipulators are better off casting o5 instead (p gets more points,
b gets fewer points, and the scores of a and c do not change).
o4 b > p > c > a The manipulators are better off casting o5 instead (p gets more points,
b gets fewer points, c gets fewer points, a gets more points but a cannot
become a winner anyway).
o5 p > b > a > c The manipulators might use this order.
o6 p > b > c > a The manipulators are better off casting o5 instead (c gets fewer points
and a gets more points but a cannot become a winner anyway; the scores
of p and b do not change).
o7 p > c > b > a The manipulators might use this order.
o8 c > p > b > a The manipulators are better off casting o7 instead (p gets more points,
c gets fewer points, and the scores of a and b do not change).
Table 1: The eight preference orders consistent with aL bL pL c and comments as to which
of them the manipulators may choose to use.
Let z5 be the total weight of the manipulators that vote o5 and let z7 be the total weight
of the manipulators that vote o7. Clearly, z5 + z7 = 2K. Now, including the manipulators,
the candidates have the following scores:
1. scoreS∪T (a) = 14K + z5,
2. scoreS∪T (b) = 32K + 2z5 + z7,
3. scoreS∪T (p) = 29K + 3z5 + 3z7 = 35K, and
4. scoreS∪T (c) = 33K + 2z7.
It is easy to see that p is a winner of election (C,S ∪T ) if and only if 32K+2z5+ z7 ≤ 35K
and 33K + 2z7 ≤ 35K, which is equivalent to
2z5 + z7 ≤ 3K,(4.a)
2z7 ≤ 2K.(4.b)
Since z5 + z7 = 2K, it is easy to see that the above two inequalities hold if and only if
z5 = z7 = K. Thus, the manipulators can ensure that p is a winner if and only if the
set {k1, . . . , kn} can be partitioned into two subsets that both sum up to K. Since the
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reduction is clearly computable in polynomial time, the proof for the nonunique-winner
case is complete.
To handle the unique-winner case, we change the weights of the voters in S in the above
construction as follows. Voter v1, whose preference order is c > p > b > a, has now weight
11K − 3, and voter v2, whose preference order is b > a > p > c, has now weight 7K − 2.
Then the candidates have the following scores in (C,S):
1. scoreS(a) = 14K − 4,
2. scoreS(b) = 32K − 9,
3. scoreS(p) = 29K − 8, and
4. scoreS(c) = 33K − 9.
Regardless of which votes the manipulators cast, a still cannot win, which again leaves
o5 = p > b > a > c (with total weight z5) and o7 = p > c > b > a (with total weight z7)
as the only reasonable choices for the voters in T . Now, in election (C,S ∪ T ), we have the
following scores:
1. scoreS∪T (a) = 14K − 4 + z5,
2. scoreS∪T (b) = 32K − 9 + 2z5 + z7,
3. scoreS∪T (p) = 29K − 8 + 3z5 + 3z7 = 35K − 8, and
4. scoreS∪T (c) = 33K − 9 + 2z7.
Thus, p is a unique winner of election (C,S ∪T ) if and only if 32K−9+2z5+ z7 < 35K−8
and 33K−9+2z7 < 35K−8, which again is equivalent to (4.a) and (4.b). The remainder of
the proof is as in the nonunique-winner case. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. ❑
In fact, we can extend the idea behind the proofs of part 1 of Theorem 4.1 and part 1
of Theorem 4.3 to obtain the following dichotomy result for 3-candidate scoring protocols
in the single-peaked case.
Theorem 4.4 Consider a 3-candidate scoring protocol, namely, α = (α1, α2, α3), α1 ≥
α2 ≥ α3, α1 ∈ N, α2 ∈ N, α3 ∈ N. For the single-peaked case, the constructive coalition
weighted manipulation problem (in both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner
model) is resistant (indeed, NP-complete) when α1 − α3 > 2(α2 − α3) > 0 and is in P
otherwise.21
21This result holds both in our settled model where L, the society’s ordering of the candidates, is part of
the input and in the model where L is not given and the question is whether there is any societal ordering
of the candidates that allows the manipulators to succeed.
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Proof. Consider a 3-candidate scoring protocol α = (α1, α2, α3), where α1 ∈ N, α2 ∈ N,
α3 ∈ N, and α1 ≥ α2 ≥ α3. Without loss of generality, we may assume that α3 = 0. If α3
were not 0, we could replace our scoring protocol with (α1 − α3, α2 − α3, 0) (see [HH07]).
Suppose that α1 − α3 > 2(α2 − α3) > 0, i.e., α1 > 2α2 > 0. We show that in this case the
constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem is NP-complete. Membership in NP
is immediate and to prove NP-hardness we reduce from PARTITION. Given a PARTITION
instance, i.e., a set {k1, . . . , kn} of n distinct positive integers that sum to 2K, we construct
an instance of the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem as follows. Let a,
b, and p be the candidates in C, where p is the distinguished candidate the manipulators
want to make win. There are two nonmanipulators in S, with preferences a > p > b and
b > p > a and both having weight (2α1 − α2)K. There are n manipulators in T , where the
ith manipulator has weight (α1 − 2α2)ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that, due to α1 > 2α2 > 0, each
voter has a positive integer weight. We fix the society’s order L to be aL pL b. Note that L
and its reverse are the only two orders consistent with the votes in S, so even in the model
where L is not part of the input, we will still, in effect, be working with L as the society’s
order.
We claim that there exists a partition (i.e., a set A ⊆ I = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that∑
i∈A ki =
∑
i∈I−A ki) if and only if the manipulators can cast single-peaked votes (with
respect to L) that make p a winner of (C,S ∪ T ).
Suppose there is a partition, i.e., a set A ⊆ I = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈A ki =∑
i∈I−A ki. To make p win, set (α1−2α2)K vote weight of T (say, each of the manipulators
corresponding to A) to p > a > b and the remaining manipulators to p > b > a. Note that
T is single-peaked with respect to L. We have the following scores:
scoreS∪T (p) = 2α2(2α1 − α2)K + 2α1(α1 − 2α2)K = 2
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K;
scoreS∪T (a) = α1(2α1 − α2)K + α2(α1 − 2α2)K = 2
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K;
scoreS∪T (b) = α1(2α1 − α2)K + α2(α1 − 2α2)K = 2
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K.
So p is a winner of election (C,S ∪ T ).
Conversely, suppose the votes in T can be cast such that p is a winner of (C,S ∪ T ).
Note that ∑
c∈C
scoreS∪T (c) = 6
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K.
So, in order for p to be a winner, p’s score in (C,S ∪ T ) needs to be at least 2
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K.
This can happen only if p is ranked first by every voter in T . And if we set T ’s votes like
that, p’s score is exactly 2
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K. In order for p to be a winner, a’s score and b’s score
need to be 2
(
α21 − α
2
2
)
K each. This means that the vote weight of the voters in T voting
p > a > b is equal to the vote weight of the voters in T voting p > b > a. Thus there exists
a partition.
Since the reduction is polynomial-time computable, the constructive coalition weighted
manipulation problem for the scoring protocol α = (α1, α2, 0) is NP-complete, provided
that α1 > 2α2 > 0.
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The unique-winner case can be handled by multiplying all weights in the above con-
struction by a suitable constant (depending on α1 and α2) and then subtracting 1 from
the weights in S. The idea is that subtracting 1 from the weights in S ensures that p
can become the unique winner if there is a partition, and multiplying the weights, prior
to the subtraction, ensures that the subtraction does not have any side effects that would
invalidate the (analogue of the) above correctness argument in this modified reduction.
Now suppose α1 ≥ α2 ≥ 0 but it is not the case that α1 > 2α2 > 0. We show that in this
case the constructive coalition weighted manipulation problem is in P. If α2 = 0 then our
scoring protocol is equivalent to plurality for three candidates, and we accept if and only if
p is a winner (a unique winner) when all the manipulators rank p first. Let us now focus on
the case where α2 > 0, and so, by assumption, α1 ≤ 2α2. Without loss of generality, it is
enough to consider the following two orderings L witnessing the society’s single-peakedness.
(Again, if L is not part of the input, we simply try all societal orderings.) We’ll handle the
nonunique-winner case and the unique-winner case in parallel.
Case 1: aL bL p. In this case, if the goal is to make p a winner (a unique winner), a best
vote for all manipulators in T is clearly p > b > a.
Case 2: aL pL b. To be consistent with L, the votes allowed in S are p > a > b, p > b > a,
a > p > b, and b > p > a (see the proof of part 1 of Theorem 4.1). Due to which
votes are allowed in S, we have 2 · scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(a) + scoreS(b). It follows that
scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(a) or scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(b). If we are in the nonunique-winner
model, set all voters in T to p > a > b if scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(a), and to p > b > a
if scoreS(p) ≥ scoreS(b). If we are in the unique-winner model and α1 > α2, set all
voters in T to p > b > a if scoreS(a) ≥ scoreS(b) and to p > a > b otherwise. The
α1 = α2 case follows from part 2 of Theorem 4.1.
In both cases, we accept if the manipulation action described above was successful (i.e.,
made p a winner in the nonunique-winner case (a unique-winner in the unique-winner case)
in election (C,S ∪ T )), and we reject otherwise. ❑
Finally, we mention that despite the NP-hardness results of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4, in
all these cases there are polynomial-time manipulation algorithms for the case when the
candidate the coalition wants to win is either the top or the bottom candidate in society’s
input linear order on the candidates.
5 Related Work
The paper that inspired our work is Walsh’s “Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Ag-
gregation” [Wal07]. Among other things, in that paper he raises the issue of manipulation
in single-peaked societies. Our paper follows his model of assuming society’s linear ordering
of the candidates is given and that manipulative voters must be single-peaked with respect
to that ordering. However, our theme and his differ. His manipulation results present cases
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where single-peakedness leaves an NP-completeness shield intact. In particular, for both
the constructive and the destructive cases, he shows that the coalition weighted manipu-
lation problem for the single transferable vote election rule for three or more candidates
remains NP-hard in the single-peaked case. Although our Theorem 4.3 follows this path
of seeing where shields remain intact for single-peaked preferences, the central focus of our
paper is that single-peaked preferences often remove complexity shields on manipulation
and control. Walsh’s paper for a different issue—looking at incomplete profiles and asking
whether some/all the completions make a candidate a winner—proves both P results and
NP-completeness results. We’re greatly indebted to his paper for raising and exploring the
issue of manipulation for single-peaked electorates.
As mentioned in the main text, Bartholdi and Trick [BT86], Doignon and Fal-
magne [DF94], and Escoffier, Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk [ELO¨08] have provided efficient algorithms
for testing single-peakedness and producing a valid candidate linear ordering, for the case
when votes are linear orders.
Other work is more distant from our work but worth mentioning. Conitzer [Con09]
has done an interesting, detailed study showing that (in the model where votes are linear
orders) preferences in single-peaked societies can be quickly elicited via comparison queries
(“Do you prefer candidate i to candidate j?”). He studies the case when the linear order of
society is known and the case when it is not. We mention in passing that we have looked
at the issue of preference elicitation in single-peaked societies (where the linear order is
given) of approval vectors via approval queries (“Do you approve of candidate i?”). It is
immediately obvious that single-peakedness gives no improvement for approval vectors and
1-approval vectors (approval vectors with exactly one 1; this is a vote type and should not
be confused with “1-approval” as it would be used in scoring systems, where the actual vote
is a linear order). But for j-candidate k-approval vectors (approval vectors with exactly k
1’s), k ≥ 1, it is easy to see that the general-case elicitation query complexity is exactly 0
when j = k and is exactly j − 1 when j > k, but for the single-peaked case, the elicitation
query complexity for ik-candidate k-approval vectors is at most i − 1 + ⌈log2 k⌉. That is,
we get a savings of a multiplicative factor of about k from single-peakedness.
Single-peaked preferences of course have been studied extensively in political science.
We in particular mention that Ballester and Haeringer [BH07] provide a precise math-
ematical characterization of single-peakedness, that Lepelley [Lep96] shows that single-
peakedness removes some negative results about the relationship between scoring proto-
cols and Condorcet-type criteria, and Gailmard, Patty, and Penn [GPP] discuss Arrow’s
Theorem on single-peaked domains. We refer the interested reader also to the coverage of
single-peaked preferences in the excellent textbook by Austen-Smith and Banks [AB04].
6 Conclusions and Future Directions
The central point of this paper is that single-peaked preferences remove many complexity-
theoretic shields against control and manipulation. That is, we showed that those shields,
already under frequency-of-hardness and approximation attacks from other quarters, for
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single-peaked preferences didn’t even exist in the first place. It follows that when choosing
election systems for electorates one suspects will be single-peaked, one must not rely on
results for those systems that were proven in the standard, unrestricted preference model.
This paper’s work suggests many directions for future efforts. For single-peaked ma-
nipulation of scoring protocols, we gave some NP-complete cases and some P cases. But
for manipulation of scoring protocols (in the general model where society is not required
to be single-peaked), Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra ([HH07], see also [PR07,CSL07])
have provided a dichotomy theorem clearly classifying each case as NP-complete or in P.
Can we obtain a dichotomy theorem for manipulation of scoring protocols in single-peaked
societies? Theorem 4.4 achieves this for the case of three candidates.
Throughout this paper, single-peaked has meant the unidimensional case. Do the
shield removals of this paper hold in, for example, an appropriate two-dimensional (or
k-dimensional) analogue? (We mention in passing that every profile of n voters voting by
linear orders can be embedded into Rn in such a way that each voter and candidate is a
point in Rn and each voter prefers ci to cj if her Euclidean distance to ci is less than to cj.)
In a human society with a large number of voters, even if one issue, e.g., the economy,
is almost completely polarizing the society, there are bound to be a few voters whose
preferences are shaped by quite different issues, e.g., a given candidate’s religion. So it
would be natural to ask whether the shield-evaporation results of this paper can be extended
even to societies that are “very nearly” single-peaked (see [ELO¨08, Section 6] and [Con09,
Section 6] for discussion of nearness to single-peakedness in other contexts).
Finally, we mention that subsequent work of Brandt et al. [BBHH] further explores
single-peaked electorates—looking at bribery and at control by partition of voters, and
generalizing Theorem 4.4 to each fixed number of candidates.
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